




The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) lost $4 billion in 1990 and may lose $5
billion more in 1991, according to FDIC Chair-
man L. William Seidman. These losses and other
reported problems have focused attention on the
adequacy of FDIC funding. But a more compel-
ling long-run issue is reform of the deposit insur-
ance system to ensure that similar problems do
not recur. Reform probably will include changes
in the way insurance premiums are assessed.
The annual premium that banks now pay for fed-
eral deposit insurance is simply a flat percentage
of total domestic deposits. This Letter argues that
certain aspects of banking risk can be measured
objectively, and that simple modifications to
deposit insurance pricing to reflect these risks
would generate substantial benefits.
Why Should Premiums Reflect Risk?
Private insurance companies adjust for risk by
charging higher premiums to customers who
pose greater potential for losses. For example,
drivers with poor driving records usually pay
more for auto insurance than those with good
records. Ideally, premiums reflect the true eco-
nomic cost ofthe insurance, which depends
in part on risk.
In contrast, deposit insurance premiums do not
vary with the riskiness of the bank. This failure
to adjust the price of deposit insurance for risk
has at least three harmful effects. First, flat-rate
premiums encourage banks to take on more risk
than is economically desirable. Second, safe
banks effectively end up subsidizing risky banks;
the result is likely to be a gradual change in the
composition of the banking industry over time, as
risky banks prosper at the expense of safe banks.
Finally, solvency of the insurance fund is more
difficult to maintain with premiums that do not
reflect the true, risk-adjusted economic cost of
deposit insurance.
Deposit Insurance and Two Types of Risk
The insurance fund suffers losses when regulators
close (or transfer the ownership of) an insolvent
bank. A bank is insolvent ifeconomic net worth,
or capital, falls to zero or below, where eco-
nomic capital is the difference between the cur-
rent value (not necessarily the book value) of
assets and liabilities; thus, negative economic
capital simply means that assets fall short of
liabilities. The deposit insurer covers part, or in
some cases all, of the shortfall. The potential loss
facing the insurer thus hinges on two factors:
how likely is it that capital will become negative;
and if capital does fall below zero, how low is it
likely to go before final resolution? These two
elements combine to determine the insurer's
economic liability.
Both the probability and the extent of a bank's
capital shortfall depend on two conceptually
different types of risk. The first type, financial
risk, depends on how much economic capital a
bank has. Higher capital means that the current
value of assets exceeds liabilities by more, creat-
ing a greater buffer against insolvency; financial
risk falls as capital rises, for a given size of bank.
The second type, operating risk, reflects the
capital buffer's variability rather than its size. At
higher levels of operating risk, any given level of
capital is more likely to be depleted; in addition,
the size of any shortfall is likely to be larger. A
bank's operating risk depends on the characteris-
tics of its specific assets, the liabilities it uses to
fund those assets, and its use of hedging or other
techniques to manage risk. In practice, operating
risk is difficult to measure, whereas financial risk
can be quantified in a relatively straightforward
way through the capital ratio.
Simple Routes to Risk-Adjusted Premiums
A recent study by the author and Sarah B. Ken-
dall, Assistant Professor of Economics at LoyolaFRBSF
University of Chicago, undertook an empirical
analysis ofthe effect of both types of risk on the
value of deposit insurance. The study used a
contingent-claim model to compute the eco-
nomic deposit insurance liability borne by the
FDIC for each of a group of large insured banks.
(Contingent claims are financial contracts in
which payments depend on the occurrence of
some unpredictable event, in this case insol-
vency.) The results of the study indicate that
a simplified version of risk-adjusted pricing,
reflecting only financial risk and ignoring
operating risk, may yield substantial benefits.
The study first considered what could be
accomplished by charging a single rate to all
banks regardless of risk, as under the current
structure. The rate that yielded premiums closest
to the value of the insurance was 16.2 cents per
$100 of deposits. This "optimal" single-rate pric-
ing structure was used as a base case for compar-
ison, and the performance of alternative pricing
structures was judged according to how much
better or worse they covered the true economic
cost of insurance.
A simple alternative of dividing banks into a
high-capital group and a low-capital group and
charging higher premiums to the latter group
generated a vast improvement over a flat-rate
system. Mispricing was reduced by over 80 per-
cent relative to the base case. (A 100 percent
reduction would mean that premiums exactly
matched the true economic insurance liability.)
Under the optimal version ofthis "two-bracket"
system, banks with economic capital less than
about 3.5 percent of assets would be assessed
a rate of 60 cents per $100 of deposits, while
banks with higher capital ratios would pay a rate
of only 6.6 cents. (The flat rate currently paid by
all banks, in contrast, has been 19.5 cents since
the beginning of 1991.) When the rate charged to
the low-capital group was made progressive (by
increasing the premium rate by about 15 cents
for each 1 percent decline in the capital ratio),
the improvement relative to the base case was
over 85 percent.
Thus a very simple system of risk-adjusted pre-
miums, reflecting only financial risk as measured
by bank capital ratios, could generate substantial
improvements over the current flat-rate system.
The fact that over 85 percent ofthe single-rate
system's mispricing could be eliminated through
a straightforward adjustment for financial risk
implies that incorporating operating risk would
yield additional improvement of at most 15 per-
cent. In addition, any pricing system that in-
cluded operating risk would be much more
complex and hence less desirable. Therefore,
operating risk would still need to be monitored
through traditional regulatory review.
The study also found that the capital-to-assets
ratio computed from the market value of a bank's
capital and assets, rather than from accounting
book values, was a better measure of financial
risk upon which to base insurance premiums.
For purposes of the study, market values were
derived from bank stock prices. The resulting
large improvement in deposit insurance pricing
emphasized the benefit of adjusting the capital
ratio to reflect current market value.
In principle, risk-based capital standards could
achieve the same result as risk-adjusted insur-
ance premiums. Capital requirements that create
exactly the right trade-off between operating risk.
and financial risk could make the per-dollar
value of deposit insurance constant, so that flat
rates would be optimal. However, recently im-'
plemented capital standards were not explicitly
designed to achieve this, but instead were for-
mulated to comply with an international accord
on bank capital; hence it is likely that risk-
adjusted premiums still will be needed.
Would Premiums Be "Too High"?
If such risk-adjusted premiums were in effect,
high-capital banks would pay considerably lower
premiums, and low-capital banks would pay
much higher ones than under the current system.
The riskier banks might be tempted to argue that
the higher premiums would reduce bank profita-
bility, leading to a larger number of bank failures.
The relevant issue, however, is not whether the
premiums are high relative to bank profits, but
whether the value of the insurance benefits re-
ceived by a bank equals or exceeds the cost of
the premiums paid. Insured banks benefit from
lower funding costs, as depositors are willing to
accept a lower interest rate in exchange for pro-
tection for their funds. An interesting feature of
contingent-claim models is that the derived pre-
miums are just equal to the reduction in bankfunding costs. The insurance premium paid by a
bank would be identical to the risk premium that
market pressure would force the bank to pay if
uninsured. In essence, the bank pays insurance
premiums out ofthe money saved on interest
expenses.
This interpretation implies that with premiums
set using this method, bank profits are the same
as they would be in a system without deposit
insurance. The public benefits of deposit insur-
ance are gained without any net effect on bank
profitability, after taking into account both the
premiums and the (private) funding benefit. Pre-
miums are higher for high-risk banks because
these banks receive a larger reduction in funding
costs from insurance. Any bank that would be
unprofitable as a result of paying economically
correct premiums is not an economically viable
institution and therefore should close; itremains
open under the current system only because of
the subsidy inherent in underpriced deposit in-
surance. The longer such a bank continues in
operation, the more expensive is its eventual
resolution.
Implementation Issues
In practice, any deposit insurance premium
structure, including one based on capital ratios,
should be reevaluated from time to time. The best
level of risk-adjusted premium rates is likely to
change over time, as both the range of permis-
sible banking activities and the general level of
risk in the environment change. Also, the intro-
duction of risk-based capital standards over the
next two years is likely to affect the relationship
between operating risk and financial risk in
banking, and thus may alter the optimal pre-
mium rates.
The FDIC is reported to be close to proposing
a capital-based pricing system similar to the
one described above. Why didn't the FDIC im-
pose risk-adjusted pricing at some earlier point
during its first 55 years? Historically, the financial
environment in which banks operated may have
been less risky, making risk-adjustment less es-
sential. Also, lower levels ofdeposit insurance
coverage prior to 1980 may have created more
market pressure for banks to control risk. In addi-
tion, it may be true that a public agency like the
FDIC has found it politically difficult to imple-
ment the kind of risk-adjusted differential pricing
practiced by for-profit private insurers. If so,
recent broad public recognition of deposit
insurance problems should facilitate reform.
The primary practical obstacle to implementing
risk-adjusted deposit insurance in the past has
been that the relative riskiness of banks has been
perceived as being too difficult to quantify. The
evidence cited in this Letter shows that this need
not be the case. Although operating risk is com-
plicated, financial risk can be more easily meas-
ured, and can be incorporated into the deposit
insurance pricing framework through bank
capital-to-asset ratios.
The results ofthe study discussed in this Letter
demonstrate that a system of deposit-insurance
premiums based on bank capital ratios would
be a simple and highly desirable policy reform.
Banks would face more appropriate economic
incentives, risky banks would extract less of a
subsidy from safe banks, and the deposit insur-
ance fund would stand a better chance of re-
maining solvent. The level of premiums would
not have an unduly negative effect on the profit-
ability of viable banks. And the public benefits
of deposit insurance-protection of small depos-
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